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THE PROLONGED ARM OF THE LAW: FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES, THE MAYNARD
DECISION, AND THE NEED FOR A NEW WARRANT
FOR ELECTRONIC TRACKING
Reeve Wood*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2010, a NPR story recounted how when Yasir Afifi, a California
college student of Egyptian extraction, took his car in for an oil change, his
mechanic saw a suspicious wire hanging from the bottom of the vehicle.1
Following the wire, the mechanic located a black object secured to the car with a
magnet.2 When a friend took photographs of the object and posted them on an
internet chat site, he was told that the object was a GPS tracking unit.3 This was
confirmed when, several days later, FBI agents and police officers arrived at Afifi’s
house to reclaim their equipment.4 To date, Mr. Afifi has not been charged with a
crime, but when he filed a FOIA request to uncover information about the FBI’s
investigation into his activities, the FBI called his counsel and informed them that
an investigation was ongoing.5
This story, which raises more questions than it answers, illustrates a growing
trend in American law enforcement: the deployment of tracking devices capable of
recording an individual’s travels over long periods of time and relaying location
information to officers at the time of their choosing. This kind of device allows for
officers to keep tabs on people without having to rely on costly, fallible
surveillance performed directly by officers. Instead, tracking devices operate as a
sort of “set-it-and-forget-it” surveillance team. The Afifi story would also seem to
illustrate another aspect of the growing deployment of tracking devices: the lack of
procedural safeguards for those being tracked. In fact, as the issue stands today, in
most jurisdictions officers don’t even have to talk to a judge, much less get a
warrant to install one of these units.6
And tracking is not just limited to GPS units placed on cars. Cell phones carry
the potential to become tracking devices, snitching from inside the pockets and
purses of their owners. Over the last decade, officers have widely requested
records of the automatic signals that all cell phones transmit in relaying their

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maine School of Law.
1. Mina Kim, FBI’s GPS Tracking Raises Privacy Concerns, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2010)
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130833487; Kim Zetter, Caught Spying on
Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back, WIRED (Oct. 7, 2010 10:13 PM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device.
2. Zetter, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Complaint at 2, Afifi v. Holder, No. 11-CV-00460, 2011 WL 726346 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2011).
6. See infra section IV.B-C.
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location information to the service provider. And while they do have to talk to a
judge to get this information, in many cases, they don’t even have to make a
showing of probable cause to obtain an order compelling the release of the data.
While these capabilities aid the ability of police departments and lawenforcement agencies to take on broader investigative burdens, there is something
about stories like Mr. Afifi’s that unsettles many people. As one circuit court of
appeals judge has put it, making the obligatory Orwell reference in the process,
I don’t think that most people in the United States would agree . . . that someone
who leaves his car parked in his driveway outside the door of his home invites
people to crawl under it and attach a device that will track the vehicle’s every
movement and transmit that information to total strangers. There is something
creepy and un-American about such clandestine and underhanded behavior. To
those of us who have lived under a totalitarian regime, there is an eerie feeling of
déjà vu . . . . We are taking a giant leap into the unknown, and the consequences
for ourselves and our children may be dire and irreversible. Some day, soon, we
7
may wake up and find we’re living in Oceania.

Indeed, the ability to easily track the whereabouts of citizens without having to
adhere to procedural safeguards of the warrant requirement lends itself to dystopian
visions of a state where the government can keep tabs on all its citizens. However,
as the findings of the Church Committee on Intelligence Activities demonstrated in
1976, such dark imaginings are not without real grounding in our recent history:
We have seen segments of our Government, in their attitudes and action, adopt
tactics unworthy of a democracy, and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of
totalitarian regimes. We have seen a consistent pattern in which programs initiated
with limited goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign
spies, were expanded to what witnesses characterized as “vacuum cleaners[],”
8
sweeping in information about lawful activities of American citizens.

Despite concerns that tracking technology could open the door to similar
government abuses, until recently, courts confronted with tracking technology have
largely held that it was excluded from the protections of the Fourth Amendment
because tracking individuals in public places did not violate a “reasonable
expectation of privacy.”9 However, in August 2010, the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Colombia held in United States. v. Maynard10 that the use of a
GPS tracking device was a search under the Fourth Amendment.11 The Maynard
court provided a rationale for treating prolonged tracking as a search on the
grounds that such long-term tracking was able to paint an “intimate picture” of a
7. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
8. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., REP. ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS § I(A) (1976) [hereinafter Church Committee], available
at http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIa.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2011).
9. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring) (stating that a
government interference is a search where “first, . . . a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and second, . . . the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”).
10. 615 F.3d. 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064
(June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
11. Id. at 555.
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person’s life, a picture that the individual concerned would not expect others to
have sufficient information to piece together.12 Working as it does within the
framework of the established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this rationale has
been adopted by several federal magistrate judges dealing with the issue of whether
the release of cell phone location information constitutes a search and has
energized the debate over how courts should deal with electronic tracking. And
now, after granting certiorari, the Supreme Court will review the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Maynard (under the case name of United States. v. Jones) and pass its
ultimate judgment on whether, under this theory, the use of prolonged electronic
tracking constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.13
This article examines the Maynard decision as well as the simultaneous
emergence of a vocal set of magistrate judges advocating for Fourth Amendment
protection for cell phone location information. It argues that, even if the Maynard
rationale is widely adopted and the use of tracking devices14 is found to be a search,
the Fourth Amendment principles of specificity and limited discretion on the part
of government officers mean that the warrant frameworks currently in use will not
provide adequate protection from the threat of government officers obtaining
information for which they have not demonstrated a need. Finally, it suggests
several concepts to be adopted into a new electronic tracking warrant in order to
encourage the government to use electronic tracking in a sufficiently focused
manner.
Part II provides a brief primer on the origins of the Fourth Amendment and
tries to discern basic, overriding principles contained within the amendment, which
was largely influenced by a fear of “general warrants” that gave the government
broad authority to conduct unspecific searches. Part III tracks the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence relating to surveillance technologies. Part IV describes the two most
common forms of tracking technology—GPS units and cell phones—and outlines
the state of the law around their use, emphasizing the arguments for why their
employment should qualify as a search. Finally, Part V examines the types of
warrants currently available and proposes a new tracking warrant aimed at
minimizing the ability of government officers to capture information that is outside
the immediate scope of their investigations.
It should be noted from the outset that this article is specifically concerned
with tracking that is “prolonged” in nature. This, of course, invites the dilemma of
deciding when tracking becomes “prolonged.” Because of the need to provide law
enforcement officers with guidance, should such tracking ever be deemed a search
under the Fourth Amendment, a bright-line rule will likely be necessary to provide
clarity. However, for the purposes of this article, we can proceed with the basic
12. Id. at 562-64.
13. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
14. Fourth Amendment issues are implicated in both the installation and the monitoring of tracking
devices. This article will focus strictly on the monitoring or use of these devices as opposed to their
physical installation. However, the Supreme Court has ordered the parties in United States v. Jones to
brief and argue the issue of whether the installation of the tracking device also constitutes a search. Id.
(“In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the
following question: ‘Whether the government violated respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights by
installing the GPS tracking device on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his consent.’”).

2011]

THE PROLONGED ARM OF THE LAW

289

understanding that “prolonged” tracking is that which continues beyond the
duration of a single definable “trip,” whether that trip is to the corner store or
across the country. With this in mind, we can consider the outer limits of tracking
that is not considered “prolonged” to be somewhere around a week. The
distinction is important because, as will be discussed below, it is the data produced
by prolonged tracking that has the most salient Fourth Amendment implications.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE FEAR OF
GENERAL SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.15

The Fourth Amendment has been understood to protect the citizen against an
unjustified breach of his or her rights of property, autonomy, and privacy by
requiring that agents of the government overcome certain procedural hurdles before
seizing or searching the citizen or his or her property.16 Although the current
jurisprudential treatment of the amendment is a matter of great debate—one
commentator calls it “an embarrassment” and “a mess”17—the circumstances that
influenced and shaped the amendment are reasonably clear. The particular sort of
governmental intrusion that concerned the drafters of the Fourth Amendment was
found in the form of “general warrants” and “writs of assistance.”18 The general
warrant was a “warrant, general as to the persons to be arrested and the places to be
searched and the papers to be seized.”19 As such, a general warrant could not
possibly issue on probable cause because it required little or no specificity about
who or what was to be arrested or searched.20 General warrants, however, were
limited to “a single specific event that created the cause behind the search.”21
Writs of assistance were a similar device but were subject to even less limitation: a
writ of assistance authorized a search anytime during the lifetime of the issuing

15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23-24 (2007) (describing how the language of the amendment implicates
these rights while noting that there is an ongoing scholarly debate over whether the amendment should
be read to protect a citizen’s privacy). See also generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757, 759
(1994).
18. THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 15 (2009). See also M.
Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance From the Mischief That Gave it Birth, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV 905, 912 (2010) (“The immediate aim of the Fourth Amendment was to ban general
warrants and writs of assistance.”).
19. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43 (De Capo Press 1970) (1937).
20. Id.
21. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 43.

290

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

sovereign.22 The practical result of this was that the “discretion delegated to the
official was therefore practically absolute and unlimited”; officials could search for
contraband whenever and wherever they liked.23 The extreme power that was
granted to the holder of the writ of assistance was hobbled moderately by the fact
that the writ did not authorize arrest, and that searches of buildings pursuant to such
a writ could only be conducted during the day.24
Although the English common law had long been evolving towards a
requirement of ex ante review based on probable cause,25 two English cases from
the 1760s solidified the doctrine subsequently enshrined by the Framers in the
Fourth Amendment.26 John Wilkes and John Entick were both newspaper
publishers who had produced pamphlets critical of King George III and had been
accused of publishing seditious materials.27 In Wilkes’ case, the secretary of state
issued a general warrant to search for the “authors, printers, and publishers” of his
pamphlet, but did not name Wilkes.28 Wilkes and forty-nine others were arrested,
and his private papers were confiscated.29 In the case of Entick, a warrant was
issued specifying that he be arrested but also ordered that “his papers” be brought
before the secretary to be “examined,” without specifying which of his papers were
to be brought.30 Predictably, the government officers inspected all of Entick’s
personal papers and books and confiscated hundreds of pamphlets and charts.31
Both men sued, and in both cases, the use of the general warrant was found to have
been illegal.32 In upholding a jury’s verdict for Entick, Lord Camden of the Court
of Common Pleas observed that the law did not allow for a general search as a
means of detecting offenders, and that if such a warrant were legal, “the secret
cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the
search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit
to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a
seditious libel.”33 He went on to note that the effect of such a warrant would be to
subject a person merely suspected of libel to having “his most valuable secrets . . .
taken out of his possession, before the paper for which he is charged is found to be
criminal by any competent jurisdiction.”34 “If suspicion at large should be a
22. Id. at 15-16; LASSON, supra note 19, at 53-54.
23. LASSON, supra note 19, at 54.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 35-36 (describing a 17th century treatise in which the English jurist Chief Justice Hale
advocated the illegality of general warrants used to search for stolen goods because they did not require
that the party asking for the warrant specify the particular place suspected or the probable cause of the
suspicion).
26. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 16-17; Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of
Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 875-80 (1985).
27. LASSON, supra note 19, at 43, 47; Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 808; 19
How. St. Tr. 1029, 1031.
28. LASSON, supra note 19, at 43.
29. Id. at 43-44.
30. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 810; 19 How. St. Tr. at 1033-34.
31. Id.at 810; 19 How. St. Tr. at 1034-35.
32. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) 499; 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 1168 (1763);
Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818; 19 How. St. Tr. at 1074.
33. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1063.
34. Id. at 1064.
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ground of search . . . whose house would be safe?”35 These cases were widely
publicized and closely followed by both the English public and the inhabitants of
the American colonies,36 and the Supreme Court has recognized Entick as having
been particularly influential in the formulation of the Fourth Amendment doctrine,
stating in 1886 that
As every American statesmen, during our revolutionary and formative period as a
nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom, and
considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be
confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently
37
explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.

However, the American colonists did not have to look as far as England to find
examples of heavy-handed intrusion in the name of law-enforcement. The
colonists’ interest in the Wilkes and Entick affairs probably reflected the fact that
they themselves had been made the subject of such arbitrary intrusion, largely in
the form of writs of assistance.38 In 1761, when customs officers applied to
reauthorize their writs following the death of King George II, a group of Boston
merchants, represented by James Otis, petitioned the Superior Court against the
reauthorization.39 Arguing against the writs, Otis declared that
[T]he writ prayed for in this petition, being general, is illegal. It is a power that
places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer. I say I admit
that special Writs of Assistance, to search special places, may be granted to certain
40
persons on oath; but I deny that the writ now prayed for can be granted . . . .

Otis and the merchants lost, but their arguments “reverberated across America”41 to
the degree that John Adams wrote of Otis’s speech that “[t]hen and there the child
Independence was born.”42
These well-worn episodes have been included here because they establish the
“point of departure” for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.43 They illustrate what
35. Id. at 1073-74.
36. Schnapper, supra note 26, at 912-913; LASSON, supra note 19, 45-46; Amar, supra note 17, 772
n.54.
37. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886).
38. For a full account of the use of writs of assistance in the colonies, see LASSON, supra note 19, at
ch. II, who dedicates a chapter to the topic in his book.
39. LASSON, supra note 19, at 57-58; MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 18.
40. James Otis, Argument before the Massachusetts Superior Court (Feb. 1761), available at
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2011). Part of the text of Otis’s actual
speech is available, the rest is taken from an account by John Adams, who witnessed it.
41. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 19.
42. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 406 n.56
(1995) (citation to footnote only).
43. This view runs counter to a line of scholarship, developed by, among others, Professors Amar
and Slobogin, which argues that these historical influences on the Fourth Amendment actually show that
the Supreme Court’s baseline standard of requiring a warrant and probable cause in order to execute a
search or seizure is a misunderstanding of the intent of the Framers, and has resulted in a flaw-ridden
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that, by requiring that such a high burden be met by law enforcement,
actually encourages courts to provide exceptions to Fourth Amendment safeguards. See generally
SLOBOGIN, supra note 16; Amar, supra note 17.
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are arguably a set of normative principles embedded in the Fourth Amendment: in
order for the government to interfere with a person’s right to be let alone, the
government needs to show that it has a strong reason for its interference and that its
interference must be directed specifically to deal with this reason. Thus, the
government could not search Wilkes’s printing presses without there first having
been a crime and a certain amount of evidence that Wilkes was involved in that
crime. Moreover, even if there was a crime and there was some evidence pointing
to Entick’s involvement in the crime, the government could not just take all of his
papers with an eye toward finding more evidence of his involvement. Rather, the
government must be able to specify what evidence it is seeking and narrow its
search accordingly. The “security” of the citizenry in their “persons, houses,
papers, and effects,” is to be maintained by minimizing the amount of discretion
that was given to government officials in relation to their investigative and
enforcement powers.44 At bottom, the Fourth Amendment is concerned with
government power and its abuse, and a warrant requirement built on specificity and
limited discretion is the means by which we have chosen to prevent such abuse.45
These principles can be useful when addressing new iterations of the problem
of delineating and managing the frontier between the protected privacy of the
individual and the need for law enforcement officers to be able to conduct effective
investigations. As one Judge has put it, “[t]he Amendment’s vivid history can be
particularly useful in applying the Amendment to today’s challenges and in
measuring the consequences of a particular application.”46 In this vein, the Court
has not restricted the relevance of these influences to its treatment of the seizure of
papers or searches for smuggled goods. As observed below, the ideas embodied in
them have been a source of understanding as the Court has dealt with modern
iterations of the problem of deciding how a government can go about collecting
information about its citizens. However, as its jurisprudence has developed, the
potential has emerged for the Court to lose sight of broad Fourth Amendment
principles regarding government interference with the “security” of its citizens and
focus instead on the vagaries of its own formulations.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
This section briefly traces the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence relating to
surveillance technology. As noted above, the interpretation and application of the
Fourth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court has been widely criticized
for a perceived incoherence. One of the main difficulties faced by the courts in
44. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1334 (2002) (“To the extent that the Wilkes
decision influenced the Founders, it suggests that the Fourth Amendment was adopted as a means of
restraining official discretion.”).
45. Of course, the wording of the Fourth Amendment does not demand a warrant requirement, but
merely requires that searches be reasonable. Professor Amar, among others, argues that we should rid
ourselves of the warrant requirement and adopt a more flexible reasonableness standard. Amar, supra
note 17, at 759. But see Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
820, 856 (1994) (arguing that the warrant requirement provides a rule-based approach to reasonableness
that is necessary in the modern law enforcement context).
46. Michael, supra note 18, at 922.
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applying the Fourth Amendment has been the development of new technologies
that demand an application of the amendment to situations that were unforeseeable
by the framers of the Constitution. As the Supreme Court has noted, “The Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”47
Automobiles, telephones, airplanes, electronic beepers, and thermal imagers have
all tested the conception of what it is that the Fourth Amendment protects and what
constitutes a search or seizure under the amendment.48 Evolving social attitudes
towards privacy further compound the difficulties associated with technological
developments.49 These factors, combined with the ever-present interest in effective
law-enforcement, can make the Fourth Amendment seem like something of a
moving target.
Prior to 1967, the Supreme Court had maintained that, in order for surveillance
to qualify as a search, and thus engender the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
there must be an “actual physical invasion” of a suspect’s property.50 The case that
bore the flag for this line of reasoning was Olmstead v. United States, in which the
Court held that a wiretap of the suspect’s phone did not constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment.51 The Court reasoned that “[t]he language of the
amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching
to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office. The intervening wires are
not part of his house or office, any more than are the highways along which they
are stretched.”52 In his prescient dissent, Justice Brandeis invoked Chief Justice
Marshall’s reminder that “it is a constitution we are expounding,”53 and urged that
47. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
48. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149 (holding that there was an exception to the warrant requirement in
the case of automobiles); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1928) (holding that a
wiretap of a telephone line was not a search regulated by the Fourth Amendment because there was no
physical trespass); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead and finding
that a wiretap of a phone booth was a search because the subject of the wiretap had a reasonable
expectation to privacy when using a telephone booth); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 732, 744-45 (1979)
(holding that the use of a “pen-register” to record the telephone numbers dialed by a suspect was not a
protected search because the suspect had no reasonable belief that those numbers would remain private);
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (holding that using a helicopter to fly over a greenhouse
in order to look for marijuana was not a search); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983)
(holding that the use of an electronic beeper to track a car was not a search because the car was exposed
to the public on its travels and so there was no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding that the use of an electronic beeper to determine if contraband was
inside a suspects house was a search under the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34-35 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal imager to scan a suspects house for heat associated with
a marijuana growing operation was a search).
49. See Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 MISS.
L.J. 1, 40-42 (2005) (“Our interest in, and desire for, privacy increased in the twentieth century, for a
variety of reasons. That interest seems to have reached new levels in the early years of the twenty-first
century . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
50. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 465.
53. Id. at 472 (Brandies, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 407 (1819)).
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the constitution be applied in ways that allowed it to bear on developments in
surveillance technology.54 Brandeis also made reference to James Otis and Lord
Camden, noting that “writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tapping.”55
In 1967, the Supreme Court turned away from the “physical intrusion”
standard. In Katz v. United States,56 a case that involved the wiretapping of a
phone booth by law enforcement officers, the Court declared that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,” and that “what [a person] . . . seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”57 The Court went on to hold that the wiretap was an unreasonable
search,58 and the lasting formulation for determining whether a search has taken
place was set forth in Justice Harlan’s concurrence. The test, he stated, was
twofold: “first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”59
The post-Katz Court has examined whether the use of several types of
surveillance technology constitutes a search. In Smith v. Maryland,60 the Court
held that the use of a “pen-register”—a device that could be installed on the phone
company’s switching equipment and would record the numbers dialed by a
specified telephone61 -- was not a search.62 The Court reasoned that, by dialing his
phone, the suspect had voluntarily exposed the digits to the switchboard, which was
“merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally
completed calls for the subscriber.”63 Thus, the suspect could not have harbored an
expectation that the numbers he had dialed would remain private.64
In United States v. Knotts,65 the case most relevant to the current tracking
technologies, the Court held that the use of a “beeper” tracking device was not a
search.66 The government, on suspicion that the defendants were involved in
54. Id. at 472-74 (“[I]n the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be. The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 476.
56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57. Id. at 351. This formulation comes from a concurrence by Justice Harlan. Justice Stewart’s
opinion for the majority offered a more complex analysis of Fourth Amendment protections, and it is
probably owing to this complexity that Harlan’s phrasing has been adopted as the meaning of Katz. See
Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment’s Principled Protection of
Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 583 (2008).
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
59. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
60. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
61. Id. at 736 n.1.
62. Id. at 745-46.
63. Id. at 744.
64. Id.
65. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
66. Id. at 284-85. The “beeper” in question was a radio transmitter that emitted signals that could
be picked up by a receiver held by officers. The purpose of the beeper was to enable the officers to
follow the suspects and find them again if they lost visual contact. However, as happened in this case,
too great a distance between the transmitter and the receiver would cause the officers to lose the signal.
Id. at 277-78.
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manufacturing drugs, placed the beeper inside a container of chloroform that was
then sold to the defendants in Minnesota.67 Officers followed the defendants from
the point of purchase, watched them switch the container into another vehicle, and
then followed that vehicle into Wisconsin, where they lost the signal from the
transmitter.68 When a police helicopter equipped with a receiver located the signal
again, it was coming from the area around an isolated cabin, which was found to be
a drug laboratory.69 The Court found that the use of the beeper was not a search
because the beeper only “augmented” the officers’ ability to conduct visual
surveillance of the suspects’ vehicle, and that because a vehicle “travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view . . . a
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”70 Notable,
however, was the Court’s response to the defendant’s argument that unrestricted
use of beeper technology would create the possibility of “twenty-four hour
surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial knowledge or
supervision.”71 The Court demurred, but it said that “if such dragnet type law
enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be time enough then
to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”72
In United States v. Karo,73 the Court was again faced with the use of a beeper,
but in that case, the law enforcement officers used the beeper signal to show that
drug-making chemicals had been taken inside a home in order to obtain a search
warrant for the home.74 In this instance, the Court found that the use of the beeper
to signal that an item was inside a home was a search because it conveyed
information about the inside of the house that could not have been confirmed
visually.75 Furthermore, “private residences are places in which the individual
normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable.”76
Finally, in Kyllo v. United States,77 the Court found that the use of a thermal
imaging device to detect heat from the inside of a house was a search under the
Fourth Amendment.78 The Court stated that where the technology is used to
“explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without

67. Id. at 278.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 278-79. The officers used the information gained from following the beeper to obtain a
search warrant for the cabin. Id. at 279.
70. Id. at 281-82. The Court noted that there was no evidence that the beeper had been used to
determine the location of the chloroform any more specifically than in the general area of the cabin. Id.
at 282. However, it implicitly acknowledged that its analysis would have changed had the beeper been
used to determine that the container was actually in a private sphere. Id. at 281-85.
71. Id. at 283.
72. Id. at 284.
73. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
74. Id. at 708-10.
75. Id. at 715.
76. Id. at 714.
77. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
78. Id. at 40.
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physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant.”79 The Kyllo court seemed particularly concerned with the fact
that the premises at issue was the subject’s home, noting that “[a]t the very core of
the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion,”80 and that “the Fourth
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.”81
Creating a coherent taxonomy of the Court’s decisions on surveillance
technologies and the Fourth Amendments in order to predict how the Court will
rule when faced with a new form of technology is a project that has yielded many
different interpretations. In one formulation, the Court’s decisions represent a
creeping “co-opting” of the Katz standard in order to promote a more stringent
definition of what qualifies as a constitutionally regulated search than was
originally envisioned by the Katz court.82 In this view, the Court’s decisions have
essentially reverted to a pre-Katz definition of a search as relating to an invasion of
a “constitutionally protected area” as opposed to the victim’s privacy.83 Thus, in
this reading, it is likely that the Court’s determination about whether or not the use
of a surveillance technology constitutes a search will be premised on the physical
area that is being observed.
Another reading of these cases is that they serve to divide technology into two
basic categories: that which is “sense augmenting” and that which is
“extrasensory.”84 While sense augmenting technology gathers information that
“could theoretically be attained through one of the five human senses,”85
extrasensory technology “reveals information otherwise indiscernible to the
unaided human senses.”86 According to this interpretation, the Court generally
finds that the use of sense augmenting technologies is less constitutionally
objectionable than the use of extrasensory technologies.87 Importantly, the quantity
of evidence obtained by either form of technology will act as a trump card when
assessing whether the use of the technology constitutes a search.88 So under this
framework, the determination of whether constitutional protections apply will
largely hinge on the invasiveness of a technology as measured in relation to the
79. Id.
80. Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
81. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
82. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 241. See also SLOBOGIN, supra note 16, at 15-16 (describing the
tendency of the post-Warren courts to use the Katz standard to restrict the regulation of surveillance
techniques).
83. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 242 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34).
84. Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment,
55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 432-33 (2007). See also Ramya Shah, From Beepers to GPS: Can the Fourth
Amendment Keep Up with Electronic Tracking Technology? 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 28889 (2009) (discussing this distinction as applied to GPS tracking in state and lower federal courts).
85. Hutchins, supra note 84, at 432-33.
86. Id. at 433.
87. Id. at 436-37 (discussing Kyllo as the primary example of the Court finding that the use of
extrasensory technology is a search).
88. Id. at 438-42 (noting that the Court has stated hypothetically that the use of sense augmenting
technology would constitute a search where it results in an extraordinary quantity of information or
unusually detailed information, and that the Court has also found the use of extrasensory technology to
be constitutional where the scope of the information it reveals is limited).
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normal sensory powers of law enforcement officers, as well as the amount and
specificity of the information the technology reveals.89
IV. ELECTRONIC TRACKING
While technological development has been a constant throughout the life of the
Fourth Amendment, the last quarter of a century has seen a proliferation of devices
that, while they enable law enforcement officers to more accurately observe and
track suspects, also create opportunities for “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means
for invading privacy.”90 Such devices include powerful cameras equipped with
biometric face-recognition software, the thermal imagers mentioned above, and
detection devices that enable law enforcement officers to essentially see through
clothing in order to find secreted contraband or weapons. The focus of this article
will be on recently-developed electronic systems that enable law enforcement
officers to track the location of a civilian over an indefinite length of time.
A. The Technology
1. GPS Tracking Units
One of the most effective and cost-efficient technologies being adapted for law
enforcement purposes is global positioning system technology (“GPS”). Originally
developed by the Defense Department for military uses, GPS systems allow a
receiver on earth to communicate with multiple satellites orbiting the earth on
specified pathways.91 By triangulating its location in reference to the satellites, the
receiver is able to plot its position on the earth’s surface to within two meters.92 A
GPS receiver can also record latitude, longitude and altitude, as well as direction
and speed of movement.93 A transmitter in the receiver can then relay the
information contained therein to a monitoring party. This can be done either by
real-time monitoring of the receiver or through periodic wireless uploads of
information stored in the receiver’s memory.94 The receiver’s memory can also be
recovered when the receiver is physically retrieved. Notably, there is no limit to
the number of GPS receivers that can be in communication with GPS satellites at
any one time.95
The most common use of a GPS receiver by law enforcement personnel—at
least as evidenced by the number of court cases in which the technology is an
issue—is to track the vehicle of a person or persons of interest.96 A GPS receiver
89. Hutchins does note that the area being observed can also be a factor in determining whether a
search has occurred, primarily when that area is a home. Id. at 442-43.
90. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
91. Hutchins, supra note 84, at 414-18.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 418.
94. Shah, supra note 84, at 284-85 (internal citations omitted).
95. Hutchins, supra note 84, at 418.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259); United States v. Marquez, 605
F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); United
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can easily be affixed to a suspect’s vehicle, and the vast majority of courts have
held that the actual application of the device to the vehicle does not constitute a
search or seizure, so long as it occurred on the street or in the suspect’s driveway.97
While efforts to obtain data on the frequency of the use of GPS tracking by law
enforcement have largely been frustrated, there are indications that it is becoming
widespread practice.98 The Department of Justice has encouraged police
departments to invest in GPS tracking devices by helping to foot the bill for the
units.99 Such a proliferation is to be expected because the devices are cheap,
available, efficient, and largely infallible.100 In the surveillance context, GPS
devices do not require sleep, meals, refueling, or bathroom breaks, and a suspect is
less likely to notice that she is being monitored when the observer is a miniscule
device attached to the underside of her car than when it is a bleary-eyed detective
or surveillance team tailing her throughout her daily travels.101
Of course, the qualities that make a GPS receiver so attractive as a tool for law
enforcement also make the technology an item of particular constitutional concern.
It is subject to none of the practical limitations that serve to discourage employing
physical surveillance by officers without a very strong reason for believing that the
suspect has engaged in criminal behavior and that the surveillance will reveal
evidence of that behavior.102 It can be deployed for as long as desired with a
States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-00017-01, 2010 WL 2991229 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010); United
States v. Burton, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (N.D. Fla. 2010); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425
(N.D.N.Y. 2005); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 2009); People v. Weaver, 909
N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009); People v. Gant, No. 05-0196, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1604 (N.Y. Co. Ct.
2005); People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2004); Foltz v.
Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281 (Va. App. 2010); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
97. See, e.g., Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1215 (holding that, where the tracking device was
installed while the suspect’s car was in his driveway, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
because the suspect had not made any showing that his driveway was in any way protected from the
public view or access); Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996 (holding that “the defendant’s contention that by
attaching the memory tracking device the police searched his car is untenable.”); McIver, 186 F.3d at
1126-27 (holding that the installation of a tracking device on a suspect’s car was not a search because
the officers did not enter the curtilage of the suspect’s home, and because the suspect had no reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding the underside of his vehicle because the underside still constituted part
of the car’s exterior). But see Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d. 356, 369-70) (Mass. 2009)
(holding on state law grounds that installation of a GPS unit on the defendant’s car was a seizure of the
car).
98. Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2008, at A1.
99. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Awards More than $570,000 to Area
Law Enforcement Agencies to Combat Gangs (Apr. 14, 2008), available at www.justice.gov/
usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr0414_01.pdf.
100. A brief search of the Internet located commercially available GPS tracking units intended for
covert use for as low as $199.
GPS Tracking Devices, BRICKHOUSE SECURITY,
http://www.brickhousesecurity.com/gps-car-tracking-vehicle-logging.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
101. See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (noting that it is unlikely that officers
could have “maintained uninterrupted 24-hour surveillance” of a suspect who was tracked by a GPS
device).
102. See Bennett L. Gershman, Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure, 30 PACE L.
REV. 927, 951 (2010) (noting that it would be “inconceivable . . . . given budgetary constraints on police
work, finite time pressures for different and competing investigations, and limited police personnel,”
that officers using physical surveillance techniques would have been able to gather the same quality and
quantity of evidence used against a suspect as was gathered by a GPS device).
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minimal investment of time or money: the initial cost of the unit, a change of
batteries when required, and the effort to upload the information from the receiver
and review it.103 The use of a GPS tracking unit does not, theoretically, even
require that anyone really ever monitor it until they think that they have a reason
for doing so. The unit will passively and comprehensively record the data it is
designed to collect, whether or not that information has any real law-enforcement
purpose. The effect of these characteristics is that vast amounts of information
about a subject can be gathered in a relatively easy and wholly undiscerning
manner, and, as will be discussed later, such aggregations of information make it
possible for law enforcement to learn much more about a person than just their
physical location.104 Furthermore, these characteristics make it easy for people
who are uncomfortable with the idea of such profound governmental access to
information about where its citizens are and what they are doing to envision a
scenario in which, if left unchecked, all citizens are monitored by the state to
ensure that they are not engaging in activities that the state does not approve of: the
dystopian vision of Orwell or Huxley.
2. Cell Phones as Tracking Devices
A second form of tracking device is carried in the purses and pockets of the
vast majority of Americans.105 The standard cellular phone operates by constantly
“registering” with the nearest cellular tower or “base station” so that incoming and
outgoing calls can be accurately directed to and from the phone unit through the
tower from which the phone receives the strongest signal.106 As the phone unit
moves and the strength of the signal with one tower declines, the signal is switched
to a closer tower.107 The record of a phone’s registration with nearby towers is
called the “cell site” data or the “cell site location information” (CSLI).108 The
general location of a phone can be determined by locating the tower providing the
signal to the phone (more specifically, which “sector” or “face” of the tower the
phone is communicating with) and by measuring the strength of the signal.109
Thus, like bread crumbs along a path, as a person moves through his day, his
phone is communicating with cell towers, creating a potential record of his
movements.110 The precision of this method of tracking the location of a phone

103. See William R. Wright, Vehicle Tracking Surveillance; Is it Legal?, 26 MATRIMONIAL
STRATEGIST 1 (2008) (noting that trackers are available that run either on disposable batteries or
rechargeable batteries).
104. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
105. “As of December 2009, more than 90 percent of the overall population of the United States
subscribed to cell phone service—an estimated 285.6 million people.” Catharine Crump & Christopher
Calabrese, Location Tracking: Muddled and Uncertain Standards Harm Americans’ Privacy, 88 CRIM.
L. REP. 19 (2010).
106. Kevin McLaughlin, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are
We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 426 (2007).
107. Id.
108. Crump & Calabrese, supra note 105.
109. McLaughlin, supra note 106, at 426-27; Crump & Calabrese, supra note 105.
110. Recent Developments, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use
of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 309 (2004).
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unit is variable depending on how many towers service a given location.111 Where,
as in urban environments, there are more towers, each tower services a smaller area
and thus a phone’s location can be more accurately plotted.112 Inversely, where
there are fewer towers, each tower covers a larger area and the range in which a
specific phone could be located based on its communications with the tower is
broader.113 There has been a steady trend towards the placement of more towers or
base stations in densely populated environments in order to provide service for
increasing numbers of cell phone users.114 As the number of base stations in an
area increases, the smaller each “sector” becomes, and the more precise the
location of a cell phone will be in relation to the sectors it is communicating
with.115
The use of data from several towers, through a process of “triangulation,” can
produce even more accurate information about the location of a cell phone.116 By
measuring the time it takes a phone’s signal to reach multiple towers or the angle at
which the signal reaches the towers, it is possible to plot the location of the phone
to within 50 meters.117 In addition to triangulation, extremely accurate tracking of
cell phone location is being facilitated by the proliferation of GPS receivers
installed in phones. In response to the Wireless Communications and Public Safety
Act of 1999, the FCC promulgated regulations requiring that, by 2005, wireless
carriers had to be able to provide emergency services with the accurate location of
any cell phone user who called 911.118 This can be accomplished either through the
use of triangulation or by the inclusion of a GPS chip inside a cell phone.119
One important difference between tracking performed through the use of a
GPS receiver that is installed by law enforcement officers on a suspect’s vehicle,
for example, and tracking using a suspect’s cellular phone is that in the latter case
the authorities do not have direct access to the data—they must instead deal with an
intermediary, the service provider, to obtain the information. Authorities may
request either “historical” data, which is used to locate a person’s past locations, or
“prospective” data, which allows real-time tracking of a suspect.120 As will be
discussed below, government requests for location data are subject to an uncertain
statutory framework. However, it is clear that there is not currently a uniform
111. Crump & Calabrese, supra note 105.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data (Smith II), 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832 (S.D. Tex.
2010). Because the case names in the government’s requests for orders to disclose CSLI information
are somewhat unwieldy, they have been replaced here with the name of the issuing (or denying) judge
and a roman numeral indicating the specific order’s place in the chronology of orders by the same judge
that are referenced in this paper.
115. Id.
116. In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a
Certain Cellular Telephone (Kaplan I), 460 F.Supp.2d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
117. Id.; Crump & Calabrese, supra note 105.
118. 9-1-1 Service, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/
services/911-services (last visited October 10, 2011); James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure:
Updating Privacy Protections to Keep Pace with Technology, 865 PLI/PAT 505, 531 (2006).
119. Darren Handler, Note, An Island of Chaos Surrounded By a Sea of Confusion: The E911
Wireless Device Location Initiative, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶¶ 17-18 (2005).
120. Crump & Calabrese, supra note 105.
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requirement that a warrant based on probable cause must issue in order to obtain
cell phone tracking information.121
Another distinction between the two technologies is that, while a person who
has had a GPS tracker surreptitiously attached to their vehicle has not intended to
broadcast their patterns of travel, a person who makes a call using a cellular phone
does so with (perhaps a vague) notion that the phone is sending and receiving
signals in such a way that would probably require a cellular network, in some
manner, to know its general location. Whether or not this distinction is significant
for Fourth Amendment analysis will also be discussed below.
The constitutional concerns surrounding the use of cell phones as tracking
devices are perhaps even greater than those relating to the use of a GPS unit
attached to a vehicle. First, by virtue of possessing a cell phone, nearly every
American adult can now be tracked by the government.122 Furthermore, not only
can the government gain access to a citizen’s real-time movements from the point
at which it becomes interested in tracking the person, but it can also obtain data by
which it can account for the movements of a person in the past.123 This, combined
with increased cell-tower density and the fact that improvements in GPS
technology allow ever increasing tracking accuracy, means that cell phones have
become a means by which law enforcement could access a nearly unlimited
agglomeration of the type of data that concerned the Maynard court.124
B. The Treatment of GPS Tracking in the Circuit Courts of Appeal
As noted above, the circuit courts and state supreme courts are currently split
on whether or not the use of GPS tracking devices by law enforcement officers
constitutes a search. With relative economy of space in mind, this survey will only
examine decisions by circuit courts of appeal as these cases are representative of
the broader arguments made at all levels.
The circuit courts have been presented with both the question of whether the
attachment of the GPS unit is a search as well as whether its use to record
information is a search, but only the decisions examining use, i.e. monitoring, will
be dealt with here. The courts have dealt with these questions in varying detail but
have found in three cases that use of the devices was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment.125 Only in Maynard did a circuit court find that the use of a GPS
tracking unit was a search.126

121. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a
Trap & Trace Device (Orenstein I), 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing how the
presiding federal magistrate judge had previously authorized court orders for cell site information
without questioning the constitutionality of the release of such information without a warrant based on
probable cause).
122. Crump & Calabrese, supra note 105.
123. Id.
124. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
125. See generally United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010); United States. v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
126. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States
v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
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1. GPS tracking is Not a Search
In the cases where circuit courts found that the use of a GPS tracker was not a
search, their decisions were generally premised on an extension of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Knotts.127 In extending Knotts, the courts made little or no
distinction between the beeper device at issue in that case and a GPS unit. Nor did
these courts distinguish between the relatively short period of tracking in that case
and the weeks or months of tracking at issue in the cases before them.
In United States v. Marquez, the Eighth Circuit considered the use of a GPS
device, albeit in a rather roundabout way.128 In that case, Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agents attached a GPS tracker to a vehicle that they suspected was
involved in drug trafficking.129 The defendant was arrested after the investigators
used the device to track the use of the truck in a drug conspiracy in which he was
involved.130 When the defendant tried to challenge the legality of the use of the
device without a warrant, the court found that he did not have standing to challenge
its use.131 However, the court, citing Knotts, stated that even if the defendant had
standing, the use of the GPS device would not have been a search because “[a]
person traveling via automobile on public streets has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one locale to another.”132 Significantly, the court
made no attempt to distinguish the GPS device at issue in the case from the beeper
unit used in Knotts.
In U.S. v. Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit also failed to make a meaningful
inquiry into the differences between the older beeper units and units utilizing
GPS.133 In that case, DEA agents observed the defendant purchasing large
quantities of fertilizer “of a type frequently used to grow marijuana.”134 After
identifying the defendant, learning where he lived, and obtaining more evidence
indicating that he was involved in growing marijuana, agents attached a GPS
127. See supra Part III.
128. 605 F.3d 604.
129. Id. at 607.
130. Id. The court does not state precisely how long the subjects in this case were tracked, however
the court does relay that the batteries on the GPS unit were replaced seven times, and that the agents first
placed the device on the vehicle in May 2007, and the subjects were arrested in October 2007. Id.
131. Id. at 609. The court found that the defendant lacked standing because he did not own the
vehicle and was only “an occasional passenger therein.” Id.
132. Id. (internal citations omitted). Interestingly, the court did require that officers have reasonable
suspicion prior to installing the device, although there does not appear to have been any requirement of
an ex ante showing before the installation. Id. at 610. Although the court cites to Garcia for this
proposition, Judge Posner’s opinion in that case appears to only note that the district court judge
overseeing the initial motion to suppress in Garcia found that reasonable suspicion was a sufficient
quantum of proof on which to predicate the installation of a tracking device. United States v. Garcia,
474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007). The district court judge, in one of her orders on the defendant’s
motion to suppress, states that she adopted the reasonable suspicion requirement on the recommendation
of the magistrate judge. United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-0155-C-01, 2006 WL 1601716, at *1
(W.D. Wis. May 31, 2006). The district court judge suggested that the court would require an ex ante
showing in the future. Id. This rather ad hoc process of establishing a standard illuminates the need for
judicial clarity when addressing the question of just what oversight should be applied to electronic
tracking.
133. 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010).
134. Id. at 1213.
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device to his vehicle.135 Using multiple tracking units, the agents monitored the
defendant’s travels over the course of four months and finally arrested him after a
tracking device showed that he was leaving a suspected marijuana “grow-site.”136
After arresting the defendant, agents found a considerable amount of marijuana at
his home.137 The defendant argued that the agents’ monitoring of the device had
been a search because Kyllo had “heavily modified” the analysis used by Knotts,
and under Kyllo, the GPS unit would qualify as an extrasensory technology.138 The
court disabused the defendant of this notion, holding that Kyllo did not apply
because the GPS units at issue were not extrasensory technology139 but were, in
fact, sense-augmenting technology because they only allowed the agents to obtain
the same information that they would have gained by physically following the
defendant.140 The court went on to hold that, because this sense-augmenting
technology was not deployed against a “constitutionally protected area,” its use
could not be a search.141
Finally, in United States v. Garcia, the case that contains the most considered
defense of the use of GPS tracking without a warrant, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that the beeper used in Knotts was a “less sophisticated device” than a
GPS unit and that GPS tracking holds the potential for “wholesale surveillance.”142
However, in a somewhat cavalier opinion authored by Judge Posner, the court
decided that it need not address “[w]hether and what kind of restrictions should, in
the name of the Constitution, be placed on such surveillance when used in routine
criminal enforcement,” because the officers involved in the case had “abundant
grounds for suspecting the defendant” prior to subjecting him to GPS tracking.143
The defendant in the case had come under the police’s suspicion after several
informants had told police officers that he was intent on manufacturing
methamphetamine, and he was observed purchasing ingredients for the drug.144
Officers installed a GPS unit on the defendant’s car, and, as a result of tracking the

135. Id. The court’s opinion only calls the devices that the agents used in this case “tracking
devices.” However, the court discusses how the devices retained a record of the defendant’s travels,
which the agents could access either when they retrieved the units or remotely. Id. at 1213, 1216. This
indicates that the units used by the agents were GPS units as opposed to beeper units.
136. Id. at 1213-14.
137. Id. at 1214.
138. Id. at 1216.
139. The court here used the term “sense enhancing” as opposed to “extrasensory,” but the meaning
is the same in relation to technology that is “sense augmenting.” See supra Part III.
140. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. The court viewed the information obtained through the use
of the tracking devices in its narrowest sense, stating that, “[t]he only information the agents obtained
from the tracking devices was a log of the locations where Pineda-Moreno’s car traveled . . . .” Id. As
will be described below, this narrow view is at odds with the position taken by some courts, which is
that the information made available through electronic tracking depicts a much broader range of
behavior than just the physical locations that a person visited. Especially in cases like this, where the
tracking is conducted over a span of multiple months, those doing the tracking can divine a person’s
habits, religious and political preferences, medical issues and much more.
141. Id.
142. 474 F.3d 994, 997-98 (7th Cir. 2007).
143. Id. at 998.
144. Id. at 995.
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defendant’s travels, were able to discover his methamphetamine lab.145 Judge
Posner found that the use of the GPS to track the defendant was merely a
technological improvement on physical surveillance performed by officers and that
“the [fourth] amendment cannot sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no
more efficient in the twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.”146
2. GPS Tracking is a Search
At the time of writing, there has only been one case in which a circuit court,
utilizing a theory that had been developed in several state court opinions,147 has
found that the use of a GPS tracking unit for a prolonged period of time is a search.
Because the reasoning used in this decision informs the central thesis of this paper,
and because it provides an ample discussion of most of the arguments for finding
that such use of GPS is a search, the court’s analysis will be examined in more
detail than the decisions discussed above.
In 2010, the D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Maynard, found that Knotts did
not apply where law enforcement officers used GPS tracking to monitor the
movements of a suspect over the course of a month, and that the use of the device
for a prolonged period of time constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.148
145. Id. Judge Posner’s opinion does not say how long the defendant was tracked using GPS.
146. Id. at 998. By way of illustration, Judge Posner states that similar updates to manned
surveillance include the use of cameras mounted on lamp posts and satellite imaging “as in Google
Earth.” Id. at 997. Judge Posner’s use of these technologies as examples would seem to provide a false
mark for measuring whether GPS tracking represents an increase in invasiveness over current
technologies that do not require a warrant. Firstly, while real-time satellite-image tracking of a suspect
would raise all the same constitutional concerns as GPS tracking and more, to this Author’s knowledge,
Google Earth does not provide live satellite pictures that would enable tracking. A search of case law
and other sources turns up no indication that Google Earth or any other live satellite imaging technology
has been applied by domestic law enforcement agencies to follow a suspect in real-time. Secondly,
while cameras mounted on stationary lamp-posts may implicate constitutional concerns, their use
arguably does not carry the same potential for invasiveness that is the worrying feature of GPS tracking.
147. These cases include Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 2009), People v.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009), and State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003), all of which are
referred to in Maynard. In Jackson, the Washington Supreme Court found that a GPS device attached to
the car of a suspected murderer did not merely augment officers’ senses, but instead recorded the
suspect’s position regardless of “whether an officer could in fact have maintained visual contact over the
tracking period.” 76 P.3d at 223. The court was also concerned by the potential for GPS tracking to
reveal “a great deal about an individual’s life,” including their “preferences, alignments, associations,
personal ails and foibles.” Id. Likewise, in Weaver, the New York Court of Appeals voiced its concern
about the “[c]onstant, relentless tracking” that GPS makes possible. 909 N.E.2d at 1199. The court
found that GPS represents even more than an “enhancement” of the officers’ senses, “it facilitates a new
technological perception of the world in which the situation of any object may be followed and
exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically unlimited period.” Id. In both Jackson and
Weaver, the courts found that their respective state constitutions required that authorities obtain a
warrant before using GPS tracking. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 224; Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203. In Connolly,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court—applying a less-restrictive definition of seizure than have
federal courts—found that the placement of a GPS tracker on a vehicle was a seizure under the
Massachusetts constitution because, “by using the GPS device on the vehicle to track its movements the
police asserted control over it, converting the minivan to their own use notwithstanding the defendant’s
continued possession.” 913 N.E.2d at 370.
148. 615 F.3d 544, 555-56, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. U.S. v. Jones, 131 S. Ct.
3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
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In that case, a combined FBI-DC Metropolitan Police Department task force
investigating the owner and manager of a nightclub for suspected drug trafficking
used a GPS unit to track the whereabouts of the nightclub owner’s vehicle around
the clock for four continuous weeks.149 The pattern of the defendant’s travels
became one of the central pillars of the government’s case against him.150 When
the defendant appealed his conviction based on the use of this evidence, the
government argued that, under Knotts, the GPS device was not a search because the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy during his trips on public
roadways.151 Unlike the other circuit courts that have evaluated GPS tracking in
light of the Fourth Amendment, the D.C. Circuit found that the difference in
technology between the Knotts beeper and a GPS unit—particularly the capability
of a GPS unit to enable officers to monitor a suspect’s movements for prolonged
periods of time—was fundamental enough that the Fourth Amendment analysis
that applied to the one could not be readily transferred to the other.152 The
Maynard court specifically focused on the Knotts court’s caveat that should
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . be possible
without judicial knowledge or supervision,” then “different constitutional
principles may be applicable.”153 Accepting this invitation, the Maynard court took
a fresh look at the Katz test as it applied to prolonged GPS tracking.
The court in Maynard began by defining the “information” that the defendant
claimed was private.154 Whereas in Knotts the information at issue was the
defendant’s movement between two locations, in Maynard the information that the
defendant argued was private was the record of his total travels over the course of
the twenty-eight days he was monitored.155 The court then examined whether or
not the defendant had exposed this information to the public, either actually or
constructively, on the theory that, if he had done so, he could not have had a
reasonable expectation to privacy, per the Katz standard.156 The court found that
the defendant had not actually exposed the totality of his movements over the
course of the month because such exposure, in Fourth Amendment terms, only
occurs where a person reasonably expects that others will observe it, and in this
case, the defendant could not reasonably expect that any individual citizen would

149. Id. at 549, 555.
150. Id. at 562 n.*.
151. Id. at 556.
152. Id. at 556-58.
153. Id. at 556 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1982)). The Knotts Court also
referred to this twenty-four hour surveillance as “dragnet type law enforcement practices.” Knotts, 460
U.S. at 283. The Maynard court explicitly notes that this language from the Knotts Court is in response
to an argument from the defendant in that case that the beeper would enable round the clock tracking of
individual citizens. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-57, n.*. This is important, because other courts seem to
have read the Knotts Court’s use of the phrase “dragnet type law enforcement practices” to refer to a
program of mass surveillance. See United States v. Walker, 771 F. Supp. 2d 803, 811 (W.D. Mich.
2011) (applying the Knotts “dragnet” language to “shotgun tactics” where officers attach devices to
multiple vehicles and wait to see “which device leads to evidence of a potential criminal violation.”).
154. 615 F.3d at 558.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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observe all of his travels over the course of a month.157
Significantly, the court also stated that precedent appeared to foreclose any
argument that, by exposing each of his individual trips, the defendant had
constructively exposed the whole pattern of his travels during the time he was
tracked.158 The basis of this finding was that the whole pattern of travel reveals
more information than would any one of its constituent parts.159 As the court
stated, this kind of long-term, unblinking surveillance
reveals types of information . . . such as what a person does repeatedly, what he
does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each
reveal more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation.
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any
single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a
month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still more; a single trip
to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few
weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person who
knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a
heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving
medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups—and
160
not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.

Having determined that the defendant did not expose the entire pattern of his
travels to the public, the court then turned to whether or not his expectation of
privacy in his travels over the course of the four weeks he was monitored was, in
fact, reasonable.161 In what is probably the most vulnerable part of its opinion, the
court concluded that the fact that several states had passed laws creating civil or
criminal sanctions for private use of GPS tracking units and requiring warrants for

157. Id. at 558-60. The court recognized implicitly that the first prong of the Katz test, the
question of whether the subject has manifested an expectation of privacy, has less bearing in
cases of prolonged surveillance. As Professor Hutchins puts it, while a defendant trying to
suppress evidence obtained through a very brief, Knotts-style period of tracking would be
expected to offer “some evidence of surreptitious behavior, . . . as the period of targeted
surveillance becomes more protracted (as is possible with GPS-enabled tracking), a
countervailing reality must be acknowledged--that citizens of this country largely expect the
freedom to move about in relative anonymity without the government keeping an individualized,
turn-by-turn itinerary of our comings and goings.”
Hutchins, supra note 84, at 455.
158. Maynard, 615 F.3d. at 560-63. It should be noted that the government did not make a
“constructive exposure” argument, so this section of the court’s analysis is essentially dicta.
159. Id. at 561-62. Dicta or not, this “aggregation theory” of the use of surveillance technology is
notable for directly and clearly addressing what commentators see as one of the principal threats of
prolonged tracking. See April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting
Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46
B.C. L. REV. 661, 696-97 (2005) (“Even though one may expect fleeting glances in public, and police
should not have to avert their eyes from what they can see in public, one does not thereby expect the
kind of targeted aggregation of data a GPS device collects on one’s movements, particularly a kind of
surveillance the individual neither can detect nor prevent.”); Hutchins, supra note 84, at 458 (observing
that GPS tracking enables law enforcement to compile a record, not only of comings and goings, but
also of “friends, associates, preferences, and desires.”).
160. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
161. Id. at 563.
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government use of such devices,162 as well as the fact that several state courts have
found that GPS tracking by law enforcement requires a warrant,163 was “indicative
that prolonged GPS monitoring defeats an expectation of privacy that our society
recognizes as reasonable.”164
Next, the court addressed the distinction between prolonged surveillance using
GPS, and physical surveillance conducted by law enforcement officers. The
government argued that the rationale employed in finding the use of GPS units to
be a search would have the effect of making officers’ visual surveillance of public
acts also qualify as a search.165 The court reaffirmed that its holding was grounded
in the fact that the reasonable expectation at issue was not whether someone would
observe a single trip from one place to another, but whether someone would
observe all of the defendant’s trips for a month, and that this did not implicate brief
instances of visual surveillance.166 The court also indicated that it need not address
instances of prolonged visual surveillance that might have mirrored the facts in the
case at hand, if for no other reason than that the government had made no showing
that such surveillance was ever used, and that the potential for such surveillance
was severely constricted by the enormous amount of resources it would demand
and the inherent difficulty in conducting successful long-term surveillance.167
Finally, and most importantly, the court distinguished between GPS
surveillance and visual surveillance on the grounds that the Supreme Court’s
treatment of surveillance technologies had determined that “when it comes to the
Fourth Amendment, means do matter.”168 For instance, where an undercover
officer wore a wire and recorded a suspect, there was no search, but where the
same information was obtained through a wiretap, the Court found that there had
been a search.169 “Quite simply, in the former case one’s reasonable expectation of
control over one’s personal information would not be defeated; in the latter it
would be.”170
Based on its findings that the defendant had possessed a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the totality of his movements over the course of four
weeks and that he had not exposed this larger pattern of movement to the public,
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that law
162. Id. at 564 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-4, 77-23a-7, 77-23a-15.5 (LexisNexis
2010); MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.37, 626A.35 (2010); FLA. STAT. §§ 934.06, 934.42 (2010); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-30-140 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 176.6, 177.6 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 80342, 803-44.7 (2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5761 (2010)).
163. Id. (citing State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223-24 (Wash. 2003); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d
1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009)).
164. Id. The court, however, did acknowledge that these indicators are “not conclusive evidence of
nationwide societal understandings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id. at 565.
166. Id.
167. Id. The court noted that a Special Agent involved in the investigation of the defendant had said
during the trial: “Physical surveillance is actually hard, you know. There’s always chances of getting
spotted, you know, the same vehicle always around, so we decided to use GPS technology.” Id. at 565
n.* (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 566.
169. Id. (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 429 (1963); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353 (1967)).
170. Id.
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enforcement officers had conducted a warrantless search of the defendant when
they tracked him using GPS technology and, because the defendant had been
convicted based on evidence obtained through that search, overturned his
conviction.171
There is little indication that the “aggregation theory” announced by the D.C.
Circuit in Maynard will be adopted widely in regard to GPS tracking units or that
the decision will even stand.172 Only guidance from the Supreme Court or
Congress will go any length in settling the matter. However, the decision in
Maynard is an important one. It is an attempt, within the current framework of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, to give voice to a widely held belief that, at least
in normative terms, the Constitution was designed to keep the government from
monitoring its citizens to the degree that it would be able to learn their secrets
without showing good reason for needing to do so. The line over which the
Government was not to step was much clearer when people’s secrets were kept
locked away in desk drawers, and the practical demands of physical, man-to-man
surveillance meant that the government was more likely to be judicious in
monitoring its citizens’ activities. Tracking technology has changed this dynamic,
and the Maynard decision presents a method of framing the threat posed by GPS
tracking in a way that brings that threat under the powers of the Fourth
Amendment. The Maynard rationale has also proved to be helpful to courts
dealing with another form of electronic tracking, one that poses arguably more
threat to the privacy of citizens and also is regulated by a more complex legal
framework: cell phone tracking.
C. Cell Phones as Tracking Devices: Statutory Framework and Divided Treatment
in the District Courts
Courts’ treatment of the use of cell-phones as tracking devices, both for
prospective and historical location data, differs fundamentally from their treatment
of GPS tracking units because of the existence of a hodgepodge of relevant federal
statutes governing telecommunications as well as the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The fact that cell phones are so widely owned and do
not have to be installed onto the property of the suspect makes them appealing as
tracking devices, but the trade-off for law-enforcement officers is that the
information they are trying to obtain173 is in the possession of a third party, the
cellular service provider, and a court-order is necessary under the relevant statutes
in order to compel the service provider to give out this information. It is the
request for such a court order, usually from a federal magistrate judge, that
provides the forum for the judiciary’s determination of what restrictions, either
statutory or stemming from the Fourth Amendment, apply to cell phone location
data. The quantum of proof required for the government to acquire this data is far
171. Id. at 568.
172. The Justice Department’s original petition for certiorari for Maynard was denied. Maynard v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010) (mem.). However, on June 25, 2011, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case of United States v. Jones, the case of the specific defendant whose tracking was at
issue in Manyard. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
173. See discussion in supra Part IV.A.2.
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from a settled question. As one federal magistrate judge who is prominently
involved in this issue has said, “[e]ach year . . . busy magistrate judges issue
hundreds of ex parte cell phone tracking orders, with literally no appellate guidance
concerning the proper threshold showing for their issuance--probable cause versus
something less.”174
The following sections will discuss the statutory framework applicable to
government use of cell-phone location data, specifically CSLI. It will then discuss
the differing ways in which the courts have interpreted this framework when
confronting requests for both prospective and historical data, and will note a
growing trend in recent years towards requiring a showing of probable cause in
order for law enforcement officers to compel release of cell phone location
information.
1. The Statutory Framework
The main body of law that bears on the use of cell phones as tracking devices
is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).175 The three
components of ECPA are Title I: The Amended Wiretap Act,176 Title II: The Stored
Communications Act,177 and Title III: The Pen/Trap Statute.178 These statutes set
forth a system whereby the standard of proof necessary for the government to
obtain information rises, roughly, in correspondence to the private nature of the
information sought and the invasiveness of the means of obtaining it.
The Pen/Trap Statute demands the lowest standard of proof on the part of the
government. Under the statute, if the government makes a showing that the
“information likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation,” then the court is required to issue an order allowing the government
to install a pen-register or trap-and-trace device.179 These devices are used to
identify the source-device of communications coming to a suspect’s phone or
computer or the intended recipient-device of communications sent by the suspect,
but are not meant to capture the actual content of the communications.180
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)181
affects the implementation of the Pen/Trap Statute, requiring that “information
acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices
. . . shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the
telephone number).”182 This statute explicitly shuts off the possibility that law
enforcement will be able to obtain CSLI through a pen/trap order.

174. Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 FED. CTS. L.
REV. 177, 212 (2009).
175. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified throughout title 18 U.S.C.).
176. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 (West 2011).
177. Id. §§ 2701-12.
178. Id. §§ 3121-27.
179. Id. § 3123(a)(1) (emphasis added).
180. Id. § 3127(3)-(4).
181. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-10 (West 2011).
182. Id. § 1002(2)(B).
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Under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), records related to electronic
communication
may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and
183
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.

Importantly, the definition of “electronic communication” specifically excludes
“any communication from a tracking device.”184
Finally, the Amended Wiretap Act requires that, in order to intercept the
contents of any electronic communications, the government must make a showing
necessary to meet the “super warrant” requirements outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 2518,
including a “particular description of the type of communications sought to be
intercepted.”185 A court order for a wiretap can only issue upon a finding by the
judge that, among other factors, there is probable cause to believe both that a
suspect “has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense” and that
communications related to that offense will be intercepted.186 The extra
requirement that gives this procedure its nickname is that the government must
show that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”187
Because the Amended Wiretap Statute governs the interception of “content,” it is
not at issue when considering orders for CSLI, although some groups have argued
that it should be.188
In addition to the statutory requirements of the ECPA, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41 states that “a magistrate judge with authority in the district
has authority to issue a warrant to install within the district a tracking device,”189
and that “[a]fter receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge . . .
must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to . . . install and use a tracking
device.”190 Thus, although the discussion above demonstrates that there is no
current statutory requirement that a warrant be issued in order to use a tracking
device, pursuant to this rule, any federal court order for the use of a tracking device
requires a showing of probable cause.
It is within the framework provided by these statutes and rules that government
officers and judges, without the benefit of any real appellate oversight, have tried to
183. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (emphasis added) (incorporating the definition of “electronic
communication” found at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(12)).
184. Id. § 2510(12)(c). 18 U.S.C.A. § 3117(b) defines a tracking device as “an electronic or
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”
185. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(1)(b)(iii).
186. Id. § 2518(3)(a)-(b).
187. Id. § 2518(3)(c); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register & a Trap & Trace Device (Orenstein II), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing
the difference in requirements between an ordinary Rule 41 warrant and a “super warrant”).
188. See Brief for The Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Opposing the Government,
at section III.B, Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (arguing that cell phone tracking
implicates the same privacy concerns that led to the creation of the wiretap act).
189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4).
190. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1).
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determine what level of proof is necessary in order to secure an order compelling
the release of cell phone location data. The following sections will outline the
approaches to this issue taken by federal magistrate judges, and will note the
emergence of a vocal group of magistrate judges who require a showing of
probable cause in order to issue an order to release CSLI.
2. Prospective Location Information
The issue of how to deal with government requests for prospective CSLI—that
is, court orders for service providers to turn over data on communication between a
suspect’s handset and cell towers that would occur in the future—appears to have
largely emerged in 2005, apparently due to the efforts of several federal magistrate
judges.191 Government requests for prospective CSLI data are based on one of two
grounds: 1) pursuant to the SCA alone, arguing that the CLSI constituted records of
electronic communications under the SCA, and could be released by the provider
pursuant to an order obtained on the basis of a “specific and articulable facts”
standard,192 and 2) pursuant to a combination of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA,
which would also apparently provide the authority for the government to obtain
prospective CSLI with a “specific and articulable facts” showing (this is known as
the “hybrid theory”).193
Confronted with these arguments, magistrate judges have examined each
191. There do not appear to be any published opinions on the issue prior to 2005. This probably
owes to the fact that opinions on the matter were sealed or otherwise unreported, and the indication is
that, prior to 2005, government requests for CSLI were routinely granted. Recognizing this, Federal
Magistrate Judges James Orenstein of the Eastern District of New York and Stephen WM. Smith of the
Southern District of Texas both went to the apparent extra effort of making their opinions on the orders
public and instigating a transparent judicial debate on the issue. See Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562,
566 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the magistrate judge had found no federal case law on point, although
he did acknowledge having previously “granted applications for similar relief, as recently as April 1,
2005, without questioning the legal basis for doing so or suggesting that there might be none”); In re
Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority (Smith I), 396
F.Supp.2d 747, 748-49, 749 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (stating that the case under consideration appeared to
be a matter of first impression in that circuit, that the only reported decision on the issue was Orenstein
I, and that because of the importance of the issue, and despite sealing the underlying order, he would not
seal his opinion on the case).
192. Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 563. Judge Orenstein mistakenly stated that the government was
attempting to classify CSLI as “contents of . . . electronic communication” under § 2703(a) of the SCA.
Id. (emphasis added). He acknowledged this mistake in his reconsideration of the request, which
contains a more detailed account of his rejection of the request for an order for CSLI, noting that CSLI
would be a record of electronic communication, as opposed to the contents of that communication.
Orenstein II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 302 n.4. See also Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
193. Orenstein II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (the government did not use the hybrid theory in their
initial application for an order, but argued that it applied when Judge Orenstein granted a
reconsideration of his original order); Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761; In re Application of U.S. for an
Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on
Telephone Numbers [sealed] (Bredar I), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2005). The basis of the
hybrid theory is CALEA’s amendment of the Pen/Trap Statute so that location information cannot be
given out by a provider based “solely” on a pen/trap authorization. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(B). The
government relies on the word “solely” to imply that, under CALEA, the combination of the Pen/Trap
Statute and the SCA provide sufficient authority to obtain prospective cell site data. For a clear and
detailed explanation of the hybrid theory, see Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761.
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relevant statute to determine which, if any, could support an order for issuing CSLI.
They have concluded that the Pen/Trap statute, as amended by CALEA, was unable
to do so based on the express language stating that information obtained “solely”
pursuant to a pen/trap authorization could not contain location data.194 The SCA
would seem to provide the best fit for authorizing CSLI, but the Judges have found
that it was not up to the task on two grounds: 1) because it contains an exclusion
relating to records of electronic communications from tracking devices, CSLI could
not be obtained under the SCA because the release of that data would arguably turn
the phone into a tracking device,195 and 2) because the SCA deals with “records” of
electronic communications, it can only authorize the release of information relating
to communications that have already happened.196
Finally, most magistrate judges who have published opinions on the matter
seem to have dismissed the hybrid theory197—in which the combination of the SCA
and the Pen/Trap statute would allow the SCA to lend the Pen/Trap Statute the
added authority that the “solely” language of CALEA seems to demand, while the
Pen/Trap Statute would provide the SCA with the prospective focus that it clearly
lacks—as being somewhat too fanciful. Magistrate Judge Smith, in a rationale that
has been widely adopted, points specifically to the facts that none of the statutes
reference each other198 and that the various statutes were enacted over the course of
15 years and in an order that defies the apparent logic of the hybrid theory.199
Based on this evaluation of the statutory framework, most magistrate judges
who have published opinions have found that the standard of proof required to
obtain an order authorizing the release of prospective CSLI is probable cause as
demanded by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.200 However, several
magistrate judges have, in published opinions, accepted the hybrid theory and have
194. Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 565; Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d. at 757-58; Bredar I, 402 F. Supp.
2d at 603.
195. Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 563-64; Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d. at 759.
196. Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 760-61.
197. Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location
Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1768-69
(2009) (“Generally, the government has had very little success in compelling the disclosure of real-time
CSLI by way of its hybrid theory argument.”). But see Christopher Soghoian, 8 Million Reasons for
Real Surveillance Oversight, SLIGHT PARANOIA (Dec. 1, 2009), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/12/8million-reasons-for-real-surveillance.html (stating that location information can often be gained through
a hybrid order, and referring to a presentation given by a telecom industry lawyer who stated that each
major wireless service provider receives over 100 requests a week for location information).
198. Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (“Surely if these various statutory provisions were intended to
give birth to a new breed of electronic surveillance, one would expect Congress to have openly
acknowledged paternity somewhere along the way.”).
199. Id. at 765. Smith notes that, while the “solely” language in CALEA is supposed to be the
proverbial key to the lock of the hybrid theory, CALEA went into effect in 1998. Id. It wasn’t until a
2001 Patriot Act amendment to the Pen/Trap Statute, making it apply to “electronic communications,”
that the CALEA language could have any effect on CSLI.
200. Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting A Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law
Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1082
(2010) (noting that “a majority of courts require probable cause for these orders” but also noting a
continued disagreement among the districts). See also Chamberlain, supra note 197 at 1748 n.19
(noting that, as of April 2009, of the 28 reported decisions on prospective CSLI, 20 had found that
probable cause was required to obtain a court order releasing the information).
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issued orders for the release of prospective CSLI on the basis of a showing of
“specific and articulable facts.”201 Notably, however, these courts have also
emphasized that their decisions were also based on the fact that in their cases the
government was seeking, or their orders allowed, a less invasive level of CSLI.
For instance, the decisions involved only the data relating to the duration of phone
calls, and then only information relating the cell tower actually directing the call to
the phone, as opposed to the three points necessary for triangulation.202 These
courts argue that the limited level of CLSI released to the government means that
there is no “tracking” precise enough to create a Fourth Amendment issue where
the release of CLSI has been authorized with a sub-probable-cause showing.203
Furthermore, these courts argue that CLSI that is related to a cell phone as it is
being used to make or receive calls does not convert that cell phone into a “tracking
device” as contemplated by the Supreme Court.204 Instead of a device being
installed by the government, here “the individual has chosen to carry a device and
to permit transmission of its information to a third party, the carrier.”205 Thus, the
most appropriate analogy would be to the pen register at issue in Smith v.
Maryland, where the Supreme Court found that a suspect had no expectation to
privacy in the phone numbers he dialed because he knowingly exposed them to a
third party.206 Although the reasoning of the courts demanding a probable cause
standard for the release of prospective CSLI largely avoids this question, it takes up
a more prominent role in the debate over the standard of proof necessary to obtain a
release of historical CSLI.
3. Historical Location Information
The terms of the debate over whether probable cause is required for an order to
release historical CSLI (records of cell site registrations occurring prior to the
201. In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records and
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace (Gorenstein I), 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438-49
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application of the United States for an Order (Hornsby I), 411 F. Supp. 2d 678,
679-81 (W.D. La. 2006).
202. Gorenstein I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 437-38; Hornsby I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 680 (“The Government’s
application in this case seeks only the same information (by type and degree) allowed by Magistrate
Judge Gorenstein.”).
203. Gorenstein I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (“[T]he data being sought by the Government in this
District is not what amicus believes it to be. The information does not provide a “virtual map” of the
user’s location. The information does not pinpoint a user’s location within a building. Instead, it only
identifies a nearby cell tower and, for some carriers, a 120-degree face of that tower. These towers can
be up to 10 or more miles apart in rural areas and may be up to a half-mile or more apart even in urban
areas. Moreover, the data is provided only in the event the user happens to make or receive a telephone
call. Thus, amicus’s reference to tracking devices and the cases considering this technology is not on
point.”).
204. Id. To make this case, Judge Gorenstein relies on a reading of Karo in which it was the
installation of the beeper, as opposed to its monitoring, that was at issue. Id. at 449.
205. Id.; see also Hornsby I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (“A cell phone is not a tracking device as that
term is commonly understood. Tracking devices are devices that are “installed” at the request of the
Government. Cell phones are not “installed.” They are carried (usually in a person’s pocket or purse)
and used voluntarily. Any cell phone user who has ever had a call dropped due to a lack of service
knows that their cell phone communicates with the nearest tower.”).
206. 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1978).
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application for a court order) are largely the same as those referred to above.207
However, as Magistrate Judge James Orenstein has noted, when dealing with
historical records, the SCA more readily applies due to its retrospective
orientation.208 Because of this, according to Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith,
“most courts to date have granted government access to such information under the
SCA .”209 However, the statutory issue is not necessarily conclusive, and the courts
that have required probable cause for the release of historical CSLI have largely
done so on the grounds that to release such information implicates the Fourth
Amendment. As one magistrate judge puts the argument, release of historical CSLI
based on a less demanding standard would
violate Americans’ reasonable expectation of privacy in any cell-phone-derived
information/records as to their physical movements/locations by authorizing ex
parte disclosure of that information with no judicial review of the probable cause.
It appears to this Court, from its review of current Fourth Amendment case law
and Constitutional principles, that this information is entitled to the judicial-review
protections afforded by a probable cause warrant and historically applied to
210
movement/location information derived from a tracking device.

This view has been supported by the one circuit court that has reviewed a request
for an order to release historical CSLI, which stated that, unlike the suspect in
Smith v. Maryland, cell phone users are not generally aware that the company
stores information about their location even when their phone is not in use, and so
“[a] cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with
a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”211
For the courts which, like the Third Circuit, distinguish CSLI from the pen
register at issue in Smith, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Maynard has provided
further justification for questioning the constitutionality of historical CLSI obtained
207. For a comprehensive explanation of the rationales on both sides of the CSLI discussion as it
stood through 2008, see Chamberlain, supra note 197, at 1775-88.
208. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Information
(Orenstein III), 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“I have previously concluded—and continue
to believe—that as a statutory matter the SCA permits a court to issue the order the government now
seeks without a showing of probable cause.”).
209. Smith II, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 830 (referencing several recent cases from other federal district
courts.).
210. In re U.S.for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose
Records to the Government (Lenihan I), 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 610-11 (W.D. Pa. 2008) rev’d, 620 F.3d
304 (3rd Cir. 2010).
211. In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose
Records to the Government (Sloviter I), 620 F.3d 304, 317-18 (3rd Cir. 2010). Interestingly, the Third
Circuit overturned the magistrate judge’s decision in Lenihan I requiring a showing of probable cause,
determining instead that the text of § 2703(d) required a showing of articulable facts at a minimum, and
gave judges the discretion to require a showing necessary for a warrant. Id. at 319. The court clearly
implied that one of the considerations in determining whether a warrant was required would be the
Constitutional consequences of the government’s request. Id. at 317-19. See also Smith I, 396 F. Supp.
2d at 756-57 (referring to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Forrest, 355 F.3d. 942, 951-52
(6th Cir. 2004) by saying “the Sixth Circuit was persuaded that Smith did not extend to cell site data”
because “cell site data is not ‘voluntarily conveyed’ by the user to the phone company . . . it is
transmitted automatically during the registration process, entirely independent of the user’s input,
control, or knowledge.”).
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without a showing of probable cause. Magistrate Judges Orenstein and Smith have
both issued opinions stating that the theory undergirding Maynard212—what
Orenstein calls the “intimate portrait theory”—is relevant and instructive in regard
to historical CSLI, and its application compels a finding that government
acquisition of historical CSLI can constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment.213 In reaching this conclusion, Magistrate Judge Orenstein found no
distinction based on the real-time nature of the tracking at issue in Maynard and the
retrospective nature of the CSLI being contemplated in the case before him.214 The
“intimate picture” painted by prolonged surveillance “is no less intimate simply
because it has already been painted.”215 Furthermore, he found that there was no
distinction between the invasion of privacy caused by GPS and that caused by
CSLI.216 Nor did he find that the subject of tracking had a more reasonable
expectation of privacy in his vehicle than he did relating to his cell phone.217
The law on what standard of proof is required for the government to obtain cell
phone location data is still a murky pool. A majority view that probable-cause is
required in the case of prospective CSLI may have coalesced, but it is by no means
unanimous. Things are even less clear when it comes to historical CSLI. While it
is likely that the majority of magistrate judges will still grant orders for the release
of historical CSLI based on a showing of articulable facts, there is a growing
clamor being raised by the same magistrate judges who chose to broadcast their
reasons for requiring probable-cause in order for the government to obtain
prospective CSLI. The probable-cause position also seems to have been energized
by the Maynard decision and the Third Circuit’s decision in Sloviter I. One thing,
however, is for sure: for at least six years, magistrate judges and district courts,
joined in 2010 by a circuit court, have been appealing to Congress to bring clarity
to these questions.218 Without a definitive solution, it seems likely that many
magistrate judges will continue to grant orders for CSLI based on a showing of
articulable facts without issuing opinions and that prosecutors will venue-shop to
212. See discussion of Maynard supra Part IV.B.2.
213. See Orenstein III, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 582, 596; Smith II, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
214. Orenstein III, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 585 (“The fact that the government seeks information that has
already been created says nothing about whether its creator has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
that information.”).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 589-91. The government’s premise on this count was that CSLI could not locate a subject
as accurately as GPS, and that, in this case the only data requested was that generated while the phone
was making or receiving calls, and so its use did not rise to the level of a search. Id. at 589-90.
Magistrate Judge Orenstein noted the increasing accuracy of CSLI, and found no distinction between the
limitations of CSLI data obtained only during calls, and the GPS tracking in Maynard, which only
tracked the vehicle itself and did not account for the suspect when he was on foot. Id. at 590-91.
217. Id. at 592-594. The government argued that a telephone user has less of a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding their telephone’s location than a driver does their vehicle’s location
because a cell phone user “should know” that when they place a call the service provider is informed of
the cell tower being used. Id. at 592. Magistrate Judge Orenstein acknowledged the most cell phone
users are aware of the possibility that their phones can divulge their location to the service provider, but
stated that the increase in location-based services in phones has corresponded with an expectation
among consumers that this tracking technology could be controlled or turned off, and that the
dissemination of location data was subject to their approval. Id. at 593.
218. See Chamberlain, supra note 197, at 1788-89 (describing the need for a legislative solution).
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the extent possible until they find the magistrate judge who will get them the
information they want with the minimal showing necessary. One commentator has
proposed a simple statutory fix, whereby Congress pass a single statute to the effect
of:
(a) A court shall not grant a Government application to compel disclosure of cell
site location information, whether real-time or historical, and shall not otherwise
order disclosure of such information, except upon a showing of probable cause as
authorized by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b) This law shall serve as the sole authority upon which a court may order
219
disclosure of real-time and/or historical cell site location information.

Such a legislative solution would certainly go a long way in improving the
protection of individuals’ privacy interests, but, as discussed below, it might still
fall short of the principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
V. THE NEED FOR A SPECIAL TRACKING WARRANT
So where do we stand now? In most jurisdictions, government officers do not
need a warrant to install and monitor a GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle, tracking
that individual wherever they drive for as long as the officers like. There are
concerns, however, that the prolonged tracking of individuals using this kind of
technology represents an invasion of a sphere in which the tracked individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize—the totality
of their movements over an extended period of time—and now the Maynard
decision as well as several state court decisions, have given this view a judicial
foothold. There seems to be a slightly more general acceptance that officers must
obtain a Rule 41 warrant in order to compel a cell phone service provider to release
prospective cell phone location information, but this requirement is by no means
universal. With regard to historical cell phone location data, the majority position
seems to be that a warrant is not required, although there is a determined minority
of federal magistrate judges who, relying in part on the same logic that informed
the Maynard decision, require a warrant in order to compel the release of records
necessary for the prolonged tracking of a subscriber’s movements.
Let us for a moment forget precedent and the current state of the Katz test for
determining when a search has occurred. It seems likely enough that, if we focus
on the broader principles contained in the Fourth Amendment—that officers of the
government cannot be given broad discretion to interfere in the lives of citizens,
even if they suspect them of lawbreaking—the Amendment would demand that the
use of location tracking technology be considered a search. This technology makes
it possible for the government to insinuate its investigative tentacles into the
intimate and everyday portions of a people’s lives in such a constant and broad
manner that it would inarguably have troubled the authors of the Constitution, one
of the main purposes of which was to check the powers of the government in
relation to the individual. Prolonged electronic tracking, and cell-phone tracking
specifically, provides the government with the capability to compile records of the
activities of individuals that are Stasi-esque in their scope, and their use indicates a
219. Id. at 1789.
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very different relationship between the government and individual than was
contemplated by the founders. Mass-surveillance aside, to be able to record an
individual’s movements for a month without even having to expend more than a
single manpower hour or make a preliminary evidentiary showing to a judge in
order to do so, as is currently the case with the use of GPS units, is a massive grant
of discretionary power to the government official and is suspect in the light of the
Amendment’s history.220 The rationale put forward in the Maynard decision and
by several federal magistrate judges in CSLI cases manages to satisfy these broader
Fourth Amendment principles while still operating within the current
jurisprudential framework. But, if these decisions are widely adopted and
prolonged tracking found to be a search, would that be enough? Does a judicial or
legislative determination that prolonged electronic tracking is a search and requires
a search warrant go far enough in limiting the government officer’s discretion as
the Fourth Amendment seems to demand?
Perhaps because the question of whether or not prolonged use of the tracking
technologies requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment and applicable
statutes has not been answered convincingly, proponents of the warrant
requirement for prolonged tracking have not yet reached the second-order issue of
whether a search warrant, as currently conceived of, would provide adequate
Fourth Amendment protections. Accepting the mosaic theory advanced in
Maynard and adopted in recent historical CSLI cases, the prolonged use of tracking
technologies opens vast tracts of an individual’s private life to government
officials. This is owing to the fact that a tracking device, whether a GPS unit or a
cell phone, is a blunt tool—it will collect the data it is designed to collect without
discrimination, making no allowance for whether a person is engaged in activities
other than those that interest the investigator. Tracking a person for a prolonged
period can reveal all manner of activity that the individual would have considered
secret: not only that someone is regularly visiting a known drug market, but also
that they are involved in a fringe religion or are part of an environmental protest
group. As one federal magistrate judge has put it in the context of CSLI,
there is a legitimate scope problem with using a cell phone as a tracking
device. The probable cause affidavit for CSLI rarely suggests that every activity in
the target’s life is illegal activity, yet receipt of CSLI will permit the government
to “follow” the phone user’s movements 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, wherever
221
they go, whatever they are doing.

It would seem that, in order to uphold the Fourth Amendment principles of
specificity and limited official discretion, as illustrated in the Entick affair, the
220. Indeed, the power to track a person over a long period of time does not just make the
government privy to information about a person that that person does not want to share, but can also
impact other Constitutional rights. Just the threat of tracking can have a chilling effect on behavior,
serving to suppress political protest, driving it deeply underground and insulating the dominant party
from dissent. This possibility is not the product of civil-libertarian paranoia. In its report on domestic
intelligence activities and the rights of Americans, the Church Committee observed that “[t]he
Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs,
even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power.”
Church Committee, supra note 8, at section C.
221. In re Application of U.S. for an Order (Austin I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 582 (W.D. Tex. 2010).
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process by which government officials are able to gain location information about a
person should be tailored to provide as little information that is unrelated to the
potential crime in question as possible. A failure to place such procedural
limitations on electronic tracking would run the risk of warrants being issued that
would function as general warrants: allowing for the collection of large volumes of
unspecified information whether it was relevant to the investigation at hand or not.
A. The Current Warrant Options
1. The Standard Search Warrant
The standard search warrant, based as it is on the language of the Fourth
Amendment, is designed to apply to situations where the government is trying to
find physical property or evidence.222 A list of the typical grounds for which a
warrant may issue includes:
(1) evidence of a crime;
(2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
(3) property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime; or
223
(4) a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

In order for a warrant to issue, an affidavit establishing the grounds for issuing the
warrant and specifying the person or place to be searched must be sworn to before
the issuing judge.224 The judge will then make a determination as to whether there
is probable cause to believe that the grounds for issuance exists: that there has been
a crime and that the search at issue will lead to recovery of the specified evidence,
contraband or property that has been used in the crime.225
Referent as it is to physical evidence, the standard search warrant procedure
does not create a framework that is readily adaptable to prolonged electronic
tracking. Specifically, it does not provide any mechanism for dealing with the
ongoing nature of the search and the fact that, by tracking a suspect over a
prolonged period of time, the officers will necessarily be obtaining information
beyond the specific information sought. More fundamentally, there is the question
of what, exactly, is the “place to be searched”?
Traditional search warrants create an unclear time frame for how tracking
would proceed. A federal search warrant requires that a warrant be executed within
14 days of issuance,226 but what this would mean in the context of electronic
tracking is not entirely clear. In the case of real-time tracking to be conducted in
the future, such as a request for prospective CSLI or the use of a GPS unit, would
execution encompass only the request for data from the cell service provider and
the installation of the device, or would it also encompass the actual time period of
the tracking? In requests for historical CSLI, would the execution of a warrant
222. See Orin S. Kerr, Search Warrants in an Era of Digital Evidence, 75 MISS. L.J. 85, 86 (2005)
(“The existing law governing the warrant process presumes one-step searches common to the collection
of traditional physical evidence.”).
223. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
224. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A).
225. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1).
226. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i).
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apply only to the request for the information, thus allowing a request for
information from a length of time limited only by the duration of the suspect’s cell
phone account and the government’s ability to make a case that the information
would include relevant evidence? This would open huge amounts of information
about a person to government eyes, defeating the principles of specificity and
limited discretion contained in the Fourth Amendment.
2. The Current Federal Tracking Device Warrant
In 2006, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended to include
specific provisions relating to warrants for tracking devices.227 These amendments
go some way in clearing up the difficulties in applying the standard warrant
requirements to the use of tracking devices.228 They provide that federal magistrate
judges must, upon a finding that there is probable cause that a grounds for issuance
exists, issue a warrant for the installation and use of a tracking device.229 The
warrant itself must specify the person to be tracked and specify a reasonable time
that the device can be used, with a maximum limit of 45 days subject to extension
on a showing of good cause.230 Furthermore, the amendments require that the
officer obtaining the warrant must note the exact time of installation, as well as the
period during which it was used.231 The officer must also serve a copy of the
warrant on the person who was tracked within 10 days of the date on which the
tracking ended, although the government may request that notice be delayed if
authorized by statute.232
While these requirements more clearly meet the challenge of providing a
procedural framework that fits the context of electronic tracking—specifically in
accounting for the fact that tracking is an ongoing process as opposed to a
traditional physical search—they do not necessarily provide the maximum
assurance possible that the information obtained through tracking will be
adequately specific and that it will sufficiently limit the discretion of government
officers. Most problematic in this sense is the allowance for tracking a person up to
45 days (or beyond, if an extension is granted). As noted above, it is likely
impossible to utilize a tracking device in such a way that it records only
information that there is probable cause to believe will be evidence of a crime or
will lead to evidence of a crime.233 The scope of the information obtained will
always be greater than what is allegedly sought. If the goal is to allow government
officers to use tracking information in order to obtain specified evidence (or
227. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee notes (2006 amendments).
228. The rule refers to the definition of “tracking device” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b). See
supra note 184.
229. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1). As noted above, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
require that a warrant be issued in order to use a tracking device, but only require that a magistrate judge
issue a warrant for the installation and use of a tracking device upon the requisite showing.
230. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C).
231. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(A).
232. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(C), (f)(3).
233. Whether, under Rule 41, a tracking device can only be used where it itself records evidence of a
crime or, on the other hand, will lead to evidence of a crime is up for debate. See Austin I, 727 F. Supp.
2d at 581-84 (discussing this issue in relation to CSLI).
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specified data that will lead to evidence) but at the same time restrict, to the highest
degree possible, extraneous information, a potentially 45-plus day tracking period
without judicial oversight is too broad. It is too broad because, simply, it does not
create enough of a procedural burden to the government to balance the fact that the
government will be able to access much more information than it will actually
need. Setting a default rule requiring more judicial oversight by decreasing the
length of time that tracking could continue without reauthorization would
encourage government officers to seek highly specified information (i.e. not engage
in fishing expeditions) and to go about obtaining it in the most efficient way, thus
limiting as much as possible their access to information unrelated to what they are
seeking. Although the current rule can clearly be used by magistrate judges to this
effect, it also allows for the possibility that magistrate judges sympathetic to the
government can allow for long tracking periods in situations where the evidence
provided in the government affidavit might not merit extended tracking.
Moreover, the current wording of the rule leaves some doubt about the
treatment of cell-phone tracking. As federal magistrate judges have noticed, the
definition of tracking device is so broad that when cell phone location information
is sought to such a degree that it allows tracking, it is difficult to argue that a cell
phone does not qualify as a tracking device.234 However, the current tracking
device warrant requirements technically leaves the issue open to debate, allowing
for the potential of a massive gap in the regulation of electronic tracking by the
government.
B. Suggestions for an Electronic Tracking Warrant
As discussed above, the current warrant requirements, whether under
traditional search warrants or under the Federal tracking device warrant, may not
provide the most effective protection from the government’s ability to access
information to which it is not entitled under the Fourth Amendment. What follows
are several general suggestions for state rules committees, the Federal Rules
Committee, or, alternatively, Congress, to consider in crafting electronic tracking
warrants that will provide the most protection for citizens while still allowing the
government to use electronic tracking in beneficial ways.235 Several of these
234. Id. at 578 (quoting Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753, and noting the breadth of the statutory
definition of “tracking device”).
235. Although these suggestions are aimed at both state and federal rules committees, the Federal
Rules Committee indicates that only Federal Courts should issue warrants for the use of tracking
devices. According to the Advisory Committee:
Because the authorized tracking may involve more than one district or state, the
Committee believes that only federal judicial officers should be authorized to issue this
type of warrant. Even where officers have no reason to believe initially that a person or
property will move outside the district of issuance, issuing a warrant to authorize tracking
both inside and outside the district avoids the necessity of obtaining multiple warrants if
the property or person later crosses district or state lines.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee notes (2006 amendments). Despite this, several states currently
provide for court orders authorizing the use of tracking devices. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5761 (2010)
(authorizing the use of tracking devices on a showing of reasonable suspicion); UTAH CODE ANN. § 1723a-15.5 (West 2010) (authorizing the use of tracking devices on a showing of relevancy to an ongoing
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suggestions are informed by language from the Amended Wiretap Act,236 which,
although statutory, represents another instance in which decision makers have tried
to create adequate safeguards for a surveillance technology that has the capacity to
capture a much broader amount of information than is relevant to a specific
investigation.237
Affidavits in support of a requested tracking warrant should include a
“particular statement” of the information sought through tracking. This should
include either the specific location(s) that a suspect is suspected of visiting (or not
visiting), or else the nature of an unidentified location that the government is trying
to identify, and the available evidence that indicates that the suspect’s presence
these locations constitutes evidence of a crime or will lead directly to evidence of a
crime. Although this requirement may be considered inherent in the showing of
probable cause, a clear statement of the expectation sets a tone of exacting
specificity.
Likewise, affidavits in support of a request for a tracking warrant should
include a statement laying out the evidence indicating that use of a tracking device
at the present time will yield the information sought. Thus, to issue a tracking
warrant, a judge will have to find that, not only is there probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed and that tracking will lead to the specified
evidence of the crime, but also that there is probable cause that tracking during the
specified period will lead to this evidence.
A rule creating a tracking device warrant should include language that
specifically includes requests for cell phone location information when such
requests have risen to the level of a search under the Fourth Amendment. Requests
for cell phone records should be governed by the same requirements that would
apply to a GPS tracking device because, as discussed above, cell phone tracking
presents an even more invasive form of tracking. Moreover, since there is little
difference between them in terms of the potential for the government to discover
information not directly relevant to its investigation, the same requirements that
apply to prospective tracking information should apply to requests for historical
tracking. This leaves to the courts or Congress the determination of when a request
for cell phone location rises to the level of a search.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the judge issuing the order should
have the discretion to set a time limit on the tracking period, but no tracking should
go on for longer than three weeks (21 days) without reauthorization from the
criminal investigation); OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, § 177.6 (2010) (allowing for the issuance of a warrant for
the use of a tracking device on a showing of probable cause, but not requiring a warrant except where
one is needed under the U.S. Constitution).
236. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (West 2010). See also supra section IV.C.1.
237. Another iteration of this problem is found in police searches of computer hard drives. There,
the problem is supplying the requisite specificity to conduct a search in which irrelevant files are not
also opened and examined. In some cases, magistrate judges have felt the need to add further conditions
and instructions to search warrants for hard drives. In 2009, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
were updated to recognize the two-step process that was necessary with computer searches. For a
detailed overview of this issue, see Kerr, supra note 222; Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer
Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241 (2010); Lily R. Robinton, Courting Chaos: Conflicting
Guidance From Courts Highlights the Need For Clearer Rules to Govern the Search and Seizure of
Digital Evidence, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH. 311 (2010).
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issuing judge. The judge can reauthorize tracking upon either a showing of the
results of the tracking period allowed to that point, or else a reasonable explanation
of a failure to obtain the expected results, as well as a showing of good cause to
believe that a reauthorization would further the investigative goals specified in the
initial affidavit. The 21-day limit is, admittedly, a relatively arbitrary line.
However, it is an attempt to balance the need for law enforcement officers to have
adequate time to collect the information they seek with the need for sufficient
oversight to protect citizens from unfocused investigations that dredge up more
information than they ought to. As such, the 21-day limit strikes a reasonable
balance, and the nature of the showing required for reauthorization should not
overburden issuing judges.
These suggestions represent relatively minor tweaks to the current Federal
tracking warrant requirements. However, they create a slightly more burdensome
procedure for the government, a procedure designed to ensure that the
government’s use of tracking technology is narrowly focused on specified,
judicially sanctioned ends.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to map the legal landscape in relation to
electronic tracking and to give a sense of the ongoing attempts that are being made
to fit what for many is a visceral feeling—that warrantless location tracking is
somehow violative of a fundamentally American relationship between the
individual and the state—into the framework of the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence. It has also suggested that, should the Supreme Court
find electronic tracking, or some forms of it, to be a search, a specific warrant with
more safeguards than traditional search warrants and the current federal tracking
warrant will be needed in order to provide sufficient protection from government
overreach, whether accidental or purposeful.
In the coming term, the Supreme Court will weigh in on this issue. When they
do, let us hope that as they look again at their precedent, they do so with one eye on
the basic notions of specificity and limited discretion underlying the Fourth
Amendment. As the Court itself said in Boyd v. United States, in reference to Lord
Camden’s decision in Entick:
The principles laid down in [Entick] affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then
before the court . . . they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and
its employ[ees] of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,—it is the invasion of this
sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s
238
judgment.

238. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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Its decision in United States v. Jones will be another opportunity for the Court to
realign its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with the technology employed by
government agents in order to safeguard the “privacies of life.” However, even if it
finds that prolonged electronic tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment,
protecting “personal liberty” and “personal security” demands that the Court, or
Congress in its stead, must do the work of tailoring further procedure to prevent the
“unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual.”239

239. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

